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Abstract 
 
 This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are 
related to earnings management by the firm.  The motivation behind this study is the 
implicit assertion by the SEC, the NYSE and the NASDAQ that earnings management 
and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively related. 
 A non-linear negative relation is found between audit committee independence 
and earnings manipulation.   Specifically, a significant relation is found only when the 
audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors.  Surprisingly, and in 
contrast to the new regulations, no significant association is found between earnings 
management and the more stringent requirement of 100% audit committee independence.   
Empirical evidence also is provided that other corporate governance 
characteristics are related to earnings management.  Earnings management is positively 
related to whether the CEO sits on the board’s compensation committee.  It is negatively 
related to the CEO’s shareholdings and to whether a large outside shareholder sits on the 
board’s audit committee. These results suggest that boards structured to be more 
independent of the CEO may be more effective in monitoring the corporate financial 
accounting process. 
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I.  Introduction 
In December 1999 the NYSE and NASDAQ modified their requirements for audit 
committees for all listed, large U.S. companies.1  Under the new standards, firms must 
maintain audit committees with at least three directors, “all of whom have no relationship 
to the company that may interfere with the exercise of their independence from 
management and the company.”2  These new requirements are in response to the SEC’s 
call for improving the effectiveness of corporate audit committees in overseeing the 
financial reporting process.  One specific area of concern to the SEC was inappropriate 
“earnings management” by the firm defined as “the practice of distorting the true 
financial performance of the company.”3 The common thread running through the SEC 
and stock exchange proposals is an implicit positive connection between earnings 
management and non-independent audit committees.  Yet no study to date has explicitly 
tested this assertion.4  The purpose of this paper is to undertake such as study.  
                                                                 
1 These changes were based on The Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, issued in February 1999.  The NYSE and 
NASDAQ sponsored the committee, created in September 1998. Note that the NASDAQ is comprised of the 
“old” NASDAQ as well as the AMEX. 
 
2 NYSE Listing Guide, § 303.01(B)(2)(a).  In the next section, I provide more details on the definition of 
independence as well as exclusions to the NYSE and NASDAQ rules. 
 
3 See SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt’s Address to NYU Center for Law and Business on September 28, 1998, 
the SEC’s proposed rule 32-41987 published on October 8, 1999 and the final rule on audit committee 
disclosure dated January 10, 2000 for use and definition of earnings management by the SEC.  All three can 
be found on www.sec.gov. 
  
4 Two previous papers on whether the existence of an audit committee discourages the incidence of financial 
fraud produce conflicting results.  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), using a sample of 96 U.S. firms 
subject to earnings manipulation enforcement actions by the SEC, finds a negative relation between audit 
committee existence and the probability of being subject to such an action.  Beasley (1996), using a sample of 
75 U.S. firms accused by the SEC of violating Rule 10(b)-5 of the 1934 Act, finds no significant relation 
between the two variables.  In a similar vein, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991) find that earning overstatement 
errors are less prevalent for firms that audit committees.  They use a sample of 41 corrections from 1977 
through 1988 and a matching control sample. 
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Using a sample of 687 large, publicly-traded U.S. firms, I examine whether the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals (i.e., earnings management) is related to audit 
committee independence.  After controlling for other factors found to be related to 
abnormal accruals and audit committee composition, I find that earnings management is 
more pronounced for firms that have audit committees comprised of less than a majority 
of independent directors.  Surprisingly, no difference in earnings management is found 
between firms with and without wholly-independent committees.   
 However, audit committees are not created in a corporate governance vacuum.  
In fact, the Blue Ribbon Committee report on improving the effectiveness of corporate 
audit committees explicitly recognizes that the audit committee’s effectiveness is 
embedded within the larger corporate governess process.5  Nor should it be ignored that 
audit committees report to the board as a whole.  Given the complexity of the audit 
committee’s interactions with the board, I also examine whether earnings management is 
related to other board characteristics.  Specifically, I examine the relation between 
earnings manipulation and overall board independence, whether the CEO sits on the 
board’s nominating committee and whether the CEO sits on the board’s compensation 
committee. The assertion is that better, more independent, corporate governance 
structures produces less earnings manipulations by management.   
 No significant coefficients are found for board independence or whether the CEO 
sits on the board’s nominating committee.  However, a significantly positive association 
exists between earnings management and whether the CEO sits on the board’s 
compensation committee.  This finding can be interpreted two ways.  First, a board that 
                                                                 
5 This sentiment can also be found in the Business Roundtable’s white paper, Statement on Corporate 
Governance (1997). 
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permits its CEO to sit on its executive compensation committee is “chummy” with its 
CEO. Or, a CEO sitting on its board compensation committee has both the motivation 
and the access to manipulate earnings to maximize his/her overall compensation package. 
Another corporate governance mechanism is equity ownership.  Non-management 
directors with large blockholdings are more apt to closely monitor the firm than directors 
with insignificant shareholdings.  In support of this assertion, I find a significantly 
negative relation between earnings management and whether a large non-management 
blockholder sits on the board’s audit committee.  I also find a positive relation between 
earnings management and CEO shareholdings, a result consistent with the view that 
CEOs may manipulate earnings to increase their short-term stock returns (e.g., see 
Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and Yermack (1997)). 
The overall implication of my findings is that boards and audit committees 
structured to be independent of management are best able to perform their independent 
oversight functions.  The uniqueness of this paper vis-à-vis other papers relating board 
characteristics to earnings management is that I find evidence that “ordinary” firms 
(large, U.S. firms listed on the S&P 500) appear to provide more unbiased financial 
statements if their relevant corporate governance structures are set up to be independent 
of management.  Previous papers on the subject have either examined firms committing 
egregious financial fraud (e.g., Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) and Beasley (1996))6 
or firms with incentives to overstate earnings (e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), and Parker (2000)).  Thus, this paper lends support to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
6In a related area, Carcello and Neal (2000), using a sample of 217 manufacturing firms experiencing 
significant financial distress in 1994, find an inverse relation between the proportion of inside or gray directors 
on the audit committee and the likelihood of that firm receiving a going-concern report. 
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the exchanges’ and SEC’s assertions that for all trading companies, investors will be best 
served if their elected boards provide corporate governance mechanisms consistent with 
achieving unbiased, transparent financial statements. 
 
II.  NYSE and NASDAQ Rules for Audit Committees 
Prior to December 1999, the stock exchanges and NASDAQ rules for audit 
committee composition were vague at best.  Large, U.S. listed companies were required 
or encouraged to maintain audit committees with a majority or all members being 
“independent” of management.  However, no definition of independence was given in the 
listing requirements.7  
In December 1999 the NYSE and NASDAQ modified their requirements by 
mandating that all large listed U.S. companies should maintain audit committees with at 
least three directors, “all of whom have no relationship to the company that may interfere 
with the exercise of their independence from management and the company.”8  
Simultaneously, the SEC adopted new rules to improve disclosures related to the 
functioning of corporate audit committees.9 Excluded from the audit committee are 
                                                                 
7 The NYSE required each firm to have an audit committee “comprised solely of directors independent of 
management and free from any relationship that would interfere the exercise of independent judgment as a 
committee member.” Absent in their listing standards was a definition of independence.  The NASDAQ 
required an audit committee comprised of a majority of independent directors. Their definition of an 
independent director was a “person other than an officer or employee of the company or its subsidiaries or any 
other individual having a relationship which, in the opinion of the board of directors, would interfere with the 
exercise of independent judgment in carrying out the responsibilities of a director.” The AMEX recommended 
but did not require listed companies to have audit committees.   
 
8See NYSE Listing Guide, § 303.01(B)(2)(a).; NASDAQ Market Listing Requirements § 4310(c)(26)(B).   
See also SEC Release Numbers 34-42231, 34-42232 and 34-42233, “Adopting Changes to Listing 
Requirements for the NASD, AMEX, and NYSE Regarding Audit Committees.” 
 
9 See Release Number 34-42266, “Adopting Rules Regarding Disclosure by Audit Committees, Including 
Discussions with Auditors Regarding Financial Statements.” 
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directors who are current employees, former employees within the last three years, have 
cross compensation committee links, or are immediate family members of an executive 
officer. In addition, for the NASDAQ, a director who accepts non-director compensation 
from the firm in excess of $60,000 or whose employer receives at least $200,000 in any 
of the three past years is also excluded from serving the board’s audit committee.  
These rules, however, are not steadfast.  Both the NYSE and NASDAQ allow 
firms to appoint one director who is not a current employee or an immediate family 
member of such employee to the audit committee if the board determines that 
membership on the committee by that individual is in the best interests of the 
corporation.10  Thus, firms may maintain audit committees that are 67% (2/3) 
independent. 
 
III.  The Role of Board Audit Committees in Resolving Conflicts Between 
Management and Outside Auditors 
By state law, the board of directors manages the business and affairs of the 
corporation.11 Directors are voted in by their shareholders; thus, their fiduciary 
responsibilities are to the shareholders.   
Boards can conduct their work through the full board or can delegate their 
authority to standing committees responsible to the board.12  Beginning in the 1970’s, the 
                                                                 
10 NASDAQ Rule 4310(c)(26)(B)(ii) allows the board under “limited circumstances” to appoint any non-
current employee or family member to the audit committee.  NYSE §303.01(B)(3)(b) gives the board broader 
discretion in appointing directors with business relationships to the firm.  If the board determines that the 
independence of the director is not compromised by the business relationship, then that director may serve on 
the board’s audit committee. 
 
11 For example, see Delaware General Corporate Law  § 141(a). 
 
12For example, Delaware General Corporate Law  § 141(c) allows boards to set up committees. 
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New York and American exchanges and the NASDAQ have required or strongly 
recommended all large, U.S. listed firms to maintain board audit committees comprised 
of a majority or solely of independent directors.  The audit committee’s primary function 
is to oversee the financial reporting process of the firm.  It achieves this goal by meeting 
regularly with the firm’s outside auditors and internal financial managers to review the 
corporation’s financial statements, audit process, and internal accounting controls.   
According to the Blue Ribbon Committee Report, the audit committee is “first 
among equals” in the financial accounting process and is “the ultimate monitor” of this 
process (p. 7).  While it is impossible for me to ascertain exactly what activities each 
committee undertakes, guidelines as to what they should be doing can be gleaned by 
reading their disclosures in the proxy statements, SAS No. 61 “Communications with 
Audit Committees”, SAS No. 90 “Audit Committee Communications” and various Big-5 
accounting firm publications dealing with best practices for audit committees.    
Basically, audit committees are encouraged to interact equally with management and the 
external auditor.  Suggested areas of inquiry include management judgments, accounting 
estimates, audit adjustments, disagreements between management and the external 
auditor, and transactions between the firm and officers or employees of the firm.   Audit 
committees are urged also to examine legal issues and government regulations as they 
pertain to the firm’s financial statements and to assess the risk profile of the firm’s 
activities and internal controls. 
Although much emphasis has been put on the audit committee’s role in preventing 
fraudulent accounting statements (i.e., malfeasance of management or the outside 
auditor), Magee and Tseng (1990), Dye (1991) and Antle and Nalebuff (1991) argue that 
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legitimate differences of opinion may exist between management and outside auditors in 
how to best apply GAAP.  Antle and Nalebuff (1991) conclude that these differences will 
result either in the auditor being dismissed or, more likely, in a negotiated final financial 
report.  DeFond and Subramanyan (1998) postulate that client litigation risk may result in 
auditors preferring more conservative accounting choices than management for clients 
they perceive to be more risky.  They present evidence consistent with this assertion for a 
sample of firms experiencing auditor changes.13  These papers suggest that the audit 
committee’s role as arbiter between the two parties is to weigh and broker divergent 
views of both parties to produce ultimately a balanced, more accurate report.  
Equivalently, its role is to reduce the magnitude of positive or negative discretionary 
accruals. 
The maintained hypothesis throughout this paper is that independent directors are 
best able to serve as active overseers of the financial accounting process.   By being 
financially independent of management, independent directors have the ability to 
withstand pressure from the firm to manipulate earnings.  Further, as Fama and Jensen 
(1983) assert and Shivadasani (1993) show, outside directors have incentives to develop 
reputations as experts in decision control and monitoring ability.14,15   
                                                                 
13 DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) find that discretionary accruals are income decreasing during the last 
year with the predecessor auditor but neutral with the successor auditor.  Their results are consistent with the 
joint hypothesis that firms that changed auditors experienced high litigation risk and/or suffered from financial 
distress. 
 
14 Parker (2000) finds no evidence of a significant relation between the number of directorships held by 
outside directors and the overstatement of earnings.  Parker’s approach is different from this paper in that she 
examines only overstatements of earnings while I look at both over and understatements. 
 
15 A third possible reason could be that outside directors may be sued under federal law (Securities Act of 
1933 and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934) for misstatements in financial statements.  However, the 
indemnification statutes of state law (e.g., section 145 of the Delaware code and sections 722-726 of the New 
York code) make it unlikely that outside directors will be monetarily liable for non-fraudulent misstatements. 
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IV.  Other Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Monitoring  
4.1  Board Independence from the CEO 
 Several papers demonstrate an association between effective monitoring and the 
presence of outsiders on the board for firms experiencing gross failures of strategy and 
performance.16  Other papers show a positive link between independent directors and the 
incidence of financial fraud (e.g., and Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996), Beasley (1996)).  
These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that outside board members help 
alleviate agency conflicts between shareholders and upper management. These conflicts 
include managers maximizing their own utility at the expense of the shareholder through the 
consumption of perquisites, the selection of suboptimal investments,17 or opportunistic 
financial statements.  Shareholders benefit from director monitoring in that it maximizes 
their shareholder wealth and facilitates a liquid secondary market for their securities. 
 I test the assertion that a board’s relative independence from management is 
negatively related to earnings manipulation.  First, I use the incidence of outside directors 
on the entire board as a proxy for board independence.  However, as Klein (1998) shows, 
board effectiveness and monitoring ability depend not only on board composition (e.g., 
percent of outside directors) but also on which board committees inside and outside 
directors occupy.  Klein (1998, 2000a) provides evidence that a board whose CEO sits on 
its nominating committee or its executive compensation committee is less independent of 
the CEO.  Shivdasani and Yermack (1999) find that boards are less apt to appoint new 
outside members if the CEO is a sitting member of the nominating committee. 
                                                                 
16  For example, see Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Kosnik (1987), Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990) and Weisbach (1988). 
17See Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Amihud and Lev (1981). 
9  
 
 
Furthermore, Klein (1998) reports that audit committees are less independent if the CEO 
is on the nominating committee.  These findings suggest a positive relation between the 
CEO being on the board’s nominating committee or compensation committee and 
earnings management.18   
 Klein (2000a) also presents evidence that CEOs sitting on their board’s executive 
compensation committee receive higher salary and bonuses than CEOs not sitting on this 
key committee.  This suggests that a CEO sitting on his board’s compensation committee 
may be in a position to influence his pay package towards more earnings incentive 
bonuses.  If this is true, then I would expect a positive relation between earnings 
management and whether the CEO is a member of this committee. 
 
4.2 Relationship Investing 
 Relationship investing encompasses all situations in which a large blockholder takes 
on an active, interventionist role in the firm’s economic processes.19 For large U.S. 
companies, relationship investing is often achieved by giving a large non-management 
shareholder or one of his representatives a seat on the board of directors.  Recent examples 
include Kirk Kerkorian (Chrysler), Warren Buffet (Salomon Brothers and Gillette), 
Chartwell Associates (Avon) and Lazard Frères (Polaroid).  Being on the boards’ audit 
committee gives these investors the opportunity to monitor the financial reporting process of 
the firm.  I predict a negative relation between earnings management and the incidence of at 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
18 A direct way the CEO could influence earnings would be for him/her to sit on the board’s audit committee. 
However, for regulatory and cosmetic reasons, few CEOs choose this most obvious route.  Only two percent 
of the firms in my sample have the CEO as a sitting member of the audit committee. 
 
19 Relationship investing is a partial solution to the free-rider problem presented by Grossman and Hart (1980).   
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least one large  (e.g., at least 5% shareholdings) non-inside director on the board’s audit 
committee.20   
 
4.3 Inside Director Shareholdings 
 Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) find a negative relation between managerial 
stockholdings and the absolute value of discretionary accruals.21  They interpret their results 
as being consistent with managerial shareholdings acting as a disciplining mechanism (Berle 
and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976)).22  However, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) 
and Yermack (1997) show that CEOs manage investors’ expectations downward prior to 
scheduled stock option award to increase the value of their awards.  If inside directors or the 
CEO manage earnings to increase the value of their stock holdings, then there will be a 
positive relation between inside shareholdings and earnings management.  Thus, no a priori 
prediction will be made. 
V. Research Design 
5.1 Sample Selection 
Data about boards and board audit committees were hand-collected from SEC-filed 
proxy statements.  The initial sample contained all U.S. firms listed on the S&P 500 as of 
March 31, 1992 and 1993 with annual shareholder meetings between July 1, 1991 and June 
                                                                 
20 This definition is narrower than other recent empirical studies, which do not place the restriction that the 
active shareholder must also have a seat on the board.  For example, see Smith (1996), Strickland and Zenner 
(1996), and Wahal (1996).  The main conclusion of these papers is that relationship investing (as defined in 
their studies) is not an effective means of increasing firm value. 
 
21 Warfield, Wild and Wild (1995) define management as officers, directors and beneficial owners.  
Discretionary accruals is the difference between the firm’s current all noncash working capital and the 
previous five-year average of all noncash working capital. 
 
22 In a similar vein, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a positive 
relation between Tobin’s Q and inside director shareholdings.     
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30, 1993.  Financial Institutions (SIC 6000 to 6999) were excluded due to their unique 
working capital structures.  
Schedule 14A (the proxy statement) requires firms to disclose each director’s name, 
business experience during the last five years, other current directorships, family 
relationships between any director, nominee or executive officer, significant current or 
proposed transactions with management, “significant business relationships” with the firm, 
and number of shares held.23  Schedule 14A (Item 7(e)(1)) requires firms to state whether 
they have a standing audit committee.  If such a committee exists, firms are required to 
disclose its functions and responsibilities, its members, and the number of times the 
committee met during the last fiscal year.  
Financial data used to construct earnings, cash flows from operations, and accruals 
are from Compustat.  For the cross-sectional non-discretionary accrual models, at least eight 
firms with the same two-digit SIC codes had to contain all the necessary data to be included.  
For the time-series non-discretionary accrual models, eight years of consecutive firm data 
and the “event” year’s data had to be available.  In addition, as explained below, several 
outliers were removed.   
These requirements yield 687 observations for the cross-sectional accrual model 
tests and 683 firms for the time-series accrual model tests. 
 
                                                                 
23Significant business transactions are defined by Items 404(a) and 404(b) of Regulation S-K of the 1934 
Securities and Exchange Act.  Item 404(a) specifies a threshold of $60,000 for a transaction to be considered 
significant.  Item 404(b) defines “certain business relationships” to include significant payments to the firm in 
return for services or property, significant indebtedness by the firm, outside legal counseling, investment 
banking, consulting fees and other joint ventures.   
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5.2 Non-discretionary Accrual Models 
Any test of earnings management is a joint test of (1) earnings management and (2) 
the non-discretionary accrual model used.  Acceptance or rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no earnings management cannot be disentangled from the key methodological issue of 
how well the chosen non-discretionary accrual model separates total accruals into its 
discretionary and non-discretionary components.24, 25 
Many recent empirical papers use a variant of the Jones (1991) non-discretionary 
accruals model, written as: 
ACCRj,t/TAj,t -1 = á  [1/ TAj,t -1] + â [ÄREVj,t/ TAj,t -1] + ã [PPEj,t/ TAj,t -1] + åj,t              (1), 
 
where ACCRj,t are total accruals for firm j in year t (measured as the difference between 
earnings before extraordinary items [Compustat item #18] and cash flows from 
operations [Compustat item #308], TAj,t -1 are total assets [Compustat item #6], ÄREVj,t is 
the change in net sales [Compustat item #12], and PPEj,t is gross property, plant and 
equipment [Compustat item #7].   
 The changes in revenues and PPE are used to control for nondiscretionary (i.e., 
economic-based) components in total accruals. â is predicted to be positive because 
changes in working capital accounts are expected to be positively related to changes in 
sales.  The expected sign on ã is negative because high fixed assets should generate 
higher depreciation expenses and deferred taxes. 
                                                                 
24 Bernard and Skinner (1996) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) contain excellent discussions of this issue.   
 
25 Joint hypotheses are quite common in both the accounting and financial literature.  For example, any test of 
efficient markets is a joint test of (1) whether the market is efficient to information and (2) whether the 
expected returns model is an accurate representation of how the market prices its securities. 
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For the cross-sectional Jones model, equation (1) is estimated separately each year 
for all firms on Compustat having the same two-digit SIC code.26  Industries with less 
than eight observations are dropped from the sample.  The number of firms used in each 
industry model ranges from eight to three hundred fifteen. The time-series non-
discretionary accruals model is estimated separately for each firm in the S&P 500 
sample.27  To be included, eight consecutive observations from year t-1 through year t-9 
had to be available.   
Discretionary or unexpected accruals for each sample firm  j is defined as: 
DACj,t = ACCRj,t/TAj,t -1 – {á  [1/ TAj,t -1] + â [ÄREVj,t/ TAj,t -1] + ã [PPEj,t/ TAj,t -1]}      (2), 
where á, â, and ã are the fitted coefficients from equation (1).    
 Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) propose a “modified” Jones model in which: 
DACj,t = ACCRj,t/TAj,t -1 – {á  [1/ TAj,t-1] + â [ÄREVj,t - ÄRECj,t / TAj,t -1] + ã [PPEj,t/ TAj,t1]} (3), 
where á, â, and ã  are those obtained from the original Jones model and ÄRECj,t is the 
change in receivables for year t. 
 Several recent papers have tested the efficacy of the Jones model vis-à-vis other 
non-discretionary accruals models.  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and Guay, 
Kothari, and Watts (1996) contrast the Jones and modified Jones time-series models with 
three other time-series models.28  Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) conclude that the 
time-series Jones models is the most statistically powerful of the four models, with a 
                                                                 
26 Recent empirical studies using the cross-sectional Jones model include DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), 
Subramanyam (1996), DeFond and Subramanyam (1998), Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 
(1998), Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998a, 1998b), Peasnall, Pope and Young (1998), Guidry, and Leone and 
Rock (1999) and DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik (2000). 
 
27 Recent empirical studies using the time-series Jones model include Han and Wang (1998) and Erickson and 
Wang (1999).  
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slight nod towards their modified version.  Guay, Kothari and Watts (1996) come to 
similar conclusions although they temper their remarks by saying that none of the models 
provides an unambiguous classification of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.  
Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000) compare the cross-sectional Jones and modified Jones 
models with the other four models (the Jones and modified time-series model included).  
They conclude that the cross-sectional original Jones model is the only model 
consistently able to detect earnings management. 
 Bartov, Gul and Tsui’s (2000) results suggest that the cross-sectional original 
Jones model statistically dominates its modified form and its time-series counterparts.  As 
Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000), and Subramanyam (1996) point out, the cross-sectional 
version of the Jones model has statistical properties that make it better, ex ante, than its 
time-series cousin.  First, the number of observations per model is considerably higher 
under the cross-sectional version.  This increases the precision of the estimates.  Second, 
by not imposing availability of time-series data, the cross-sectional sample is less subject 
to survivorship bias and allows the researcher to include firms with short histories.  Third, 
misspecification of the coefficients due to non-stationarity is not an issue for the time-
series version. 
 Nevertheless, I computed discretionary accruals for the original and modified 
times-series and cross-sectional Jones models to compare their properties before 
conducting my statistical tests.29  Two basic diagnostics are done.  First, I examine the 
coefficients, á, â, and ã.  On average, á should be zero; â should be positive; and ã should 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
28 The models are referred to as the Healy (1985) model, DeAngelo (1986) model, and the industry model 
proposed by Dechow and Sloan (1991). 
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be negative.  Second, I examine the discretionary accruals.  Since the parent population is 
the S&P 500, I expect that, on average, the discretionary accruals to be zero.  That is, 
earnings manipulation may exist within the sample but, on average, the positive and 
negative manipulations should cancel each other out. 
 Table 1 contains summary statistics for the estimated coefficients, á, â, and ã.   
The parameters are better specified for the cross-sectional model than for the time-series 
model.  First, á is statistically different from zero at the .01 level for the time-series 
model but insignificantly different from zero at conventional levels for the cross-sectional 
model.  Second, the standard deviations of the parameters are much lower for the cross-
sectional model.  Third, the percentage of â and ã coefficients with the correct predicted 
sign is greater for the cross-sectional model vis-à-vis the time-series version.30 
 Table 2 reports descriptive samples for the entire sample.  As the middle rows 
illustrate, the average discretionary accrual for the original and modified Jones cross-
sectional models are .003 and .003 respectively.  The average discretionary accruals for 
the corresponding time-series models are -988 and –988, respectively.  It should be noted 
that extreme outliers are absent. Although not shown in the table, the t-statistics testing 
whether the mean DACs are zero are 0.18 (0.20) for the original (modified) cross-
sectional models and –10.91 (-10.91) for the original (modified) time-series models. 
Thus, the cross-sectional models’ DACs are insignificantly different from zero whereas 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
29 The modified Jones model, as proposed by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) uses the same parameters 
as the original model in computing the DACs. 
 
30Subramanyam (1996) and Bartov, Gul, and Tsui (2000) show similar results when contrasting the two 
models . 
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the time-series models’ DACs are significantly different from zero at the .01 level.  
Similar results are found using the non-parametric signed rank test.31 
 
5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Earnings and Accruals 
Table 2 presents other descriptive statistics for the S&P 500 sample.  Net income 
is positive for 84% of the sample and cash flows from operations is positive 97% of the 
times.  Total accruals, defined as the difference between the two, are negative for 90% of 
the firms.  Subramanyam (1996), who uses a similarly constructed sample, reports 
comparable averages and percentages for his sample of 21,631 firm-years over the 1973-
1993 period. 
 
5.4 Corporate Governance Characteristics 
Consistent with prior research, directors are classified as insiders, outsiders, or 
affiliated (“gray”) with the firm.  Insiders are current employees of the company.  Outsiders 
have no ties to the firm beyond being a board member.  Consistent with the NYSE and 
NASDAQ listing requirements, affiliated directors are past employees, relatives of the 
CEO, or have significant transactions and/or business relationships with the firm as defined 
by Items 404(a) and (b) of Regulation S-X.. Directors on interlocking boards are also 
defined as affiliates. Consistent with Item 402(j)(3)(ii), interlocks are defined as those 
situations in which an inside director serves on a non-inside director's board. 
Table 3 reports data on board and audit committee composition.  On average, 
58.4% of board members and 79.6% of audit committee members are outsiders. While no 
                                                                 
31 The signed rank test that the median DAC is zero yield p-statistics of .12 (.14) for the original (modified) 
cross-sectional Jones models and .01 (.01) for the original (modified) Jones time-series. 
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firm has a completely independent board, 73.8% of the firms in the sample have boards 
in which the majority of directors are independent of management.32  In contrast, 43.4% 
of audit committees are comprised of outside directors only and 86.7% have a majority of 
independent directors.   
Over fifty-two percent of the firms have either the CEO on the board nominating 
committee or no nominating committee. 33 Over nine percent have the CEO on the 
compensation committee or have no  compensation committee. 34   Almost two percent 
have a 5% non-management shareholder on the audit committee.   
 
VI.  Discretionary Accruals and Corporate Governance Factors  
This section contains the empirical results.  Sections 6.1 and 6.2 describe some of 
the specifications and definitions used in the models.  Section 6.3 contains univariate 
models associating the absolute value of discretionary accruals with board and audit 
committee composition and other board characteristics.  Section 6.4 presents multivariate 
models encompassing both corporate governance factors and other factors shown in the 
literature to be related to discretionary accruals and board/audit committee composition.  
Section 6.5 has sensitivity analyses. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
32 In 1992 and today, the NYSE, AMEX, and the NASDAQ required domestic listed firms to have a 
minimum of two “outside” or  “independent” directors on their boards.   
 
33 If no committee exists, then the board itself acts that committee.  For these firms, the CEO, de facto, is a 
member of the committee. 
 
34 There are no direct restrictions on the CEO sitting on his/her board’s compensation committee. Prior to 
1994, there were no IRS restrictions tying the CEO’s salary and bonus to the CEO sitting on his board’s 
executive compensation committee.  Prior to October 1993, disclosures in the proxy statement regarding 
executive compensation and the compensation committee were fuzzy, scattered, and not particularly 
informative.   
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6.1 Dependent Variable 
Following prior earnings management studies (see e.g., Healy (1985), DeAngelo 
(1986), Jones (1991) and Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000)), I assume, with the usual caveats 
presented in the last section, that high positive or negative discretionary accruals indicate 
earnings manipulations. Incentives for management to post negative discretionary 
accruals (i.e., lower earnings) include lowering the purchase price in management 
buyouts (Perry and Williams (1994), managing earnings-based bonuses (e.g., Healy 
(1985), Houlthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995), and Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999)) and 
avoiding regulatory actions (e.g., Jones (1991), Cahan (1992), and Key Galligan (1997)). 
Some documented motivations behind positive discretionary (i.e., income-increasing) 
accruals are to raise stock prices for seasoned equity offerings [Rangan (1998), Teoh, 
Welch and Wong (1998a)], for initial public offering [Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998b), 
DuCharme, Malatesta and Secfik (2000)] and for stock-financed acquisitions [Erickson 
and Wang (1998)], to meet analysts’ expectations [e.g., Burgstahler and Eames (1998) 
and Kasznik (1999)], and to avoid debt covenant violations [e.g., DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994), Parker (2000)]. 
Since discretionary accruals may be positive or negative, I use the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals as my dependent variable.35 Since this variable is bounded by 
zero, OLS will yield inefficient coefficients due to the dependent variable having a non-
normal distribution.36  Fitting a gamma function to the data reveals that a lognormal 
                                                                 
35Other studies using the absolute value of discretionary accruals as a proxy for the comb ined effect of 
income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management include Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) and 
Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998).  See also Healy and Wahlen (2000), who assert that 
the expected frequencies of finding positive or negative unexpected accruals are 50% for each group. 
 
36 The distribution has a skewness of 9.79 and a kurtosis of 109.46.  In addition, the Kolomogorov D statistic 
rejects normality at the .0001 level. 
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transformation best approximates its shape.  Thus, I estimate the “regression” coefficients 
by maximum likelihood using a Newton-Raphson algorithm on a lognormal dependent 
variable.  
 
6.2 Defining Audit Committee and Board Independence 
One maintained hypothesis is that more independent audit committees and/or 
boards are associated with less earnings manipulation.  One issue is determining 
independence.  This is not a trivial exercise as the following discussion illustrates. 
 To determine independence, three definitions are used.  The first is to define 
audit or board independence as the percentage of outside directors on the audit committee 
or on the board.  This is a common definition used in the academic literature (e.g., 
Beasley (1996)).  However, as Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) show, the relation between 
economic outcomes  (i.e., Tobin’s Q for Hermalin and Weisbach) and board 
independence may not be linear.   
A second path is to follow the NASDAQ and NYSE’s guidelines and consider an 
audit committee independent only if all directors are independent of inside 
management.37  Under this definition, audit committees can function independently if and 
only if all members are free from managerial influence. 
A third definition of board or audit committee independence is for a majority of 
members to be independent of management.  Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996), for 
example, define a board as being inside-dominated if at least 50% of board members are 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
37 Since no boards are comprised solely of outside directors, this definition is not feasible for the entire board. 
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firm officers.  The rationale behind this metric is that the majority rule will dominate the 
board’s or committee’s actions. 
The differences among definitions, particularly between the 100% and 51% rules, 
can have supply effects on different firms.  Yermack (1996) argues and shows that firms 
with smaller boards (i.e., under 10 directors) are better performers.  Thus, firms, in 
general, will be constrained as to board size.  As Fama and Jensen (1983) argue and Klein 
(1998) demonstrates, firms benefit greatly by having insiders on the board since top 
managers bring an expertise about the organization to the board’s top level decision 
making apparatus.  Further, Klein (2000b) shows that the degree of audit committee 
independence is both a function of the independence of the entire board and economic 
determinants.  These papers suggest that it may be costly for companies to maintain 
100% independent audit committees.  Thus, using the 51% (majority) definition may be a 
desirable alternative to many firms.   
 
6.3   Univariate Models  
Table 4 presents coefficients for univariate models. As Models 1-5 show, 
significantly negative coefficients are found only when independence is defined as a 
majority of independent board (Bd51%, p=.05) or audit committee (Aud51%, p=.10) 
members.  In contrast, no significant correlations are found for the continuous variables 
or for the 100% outside audit committee definition. To check the sensitivity of the fifty 
percent cutoff, I re-estimated models 1 and 4 using cutoffs of 40% and 60%, respectively.  
None of the coefficients were significant at the .10 level.  Taken as a whole, these results 
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suggest that a majority outside membership is the critical threshold for determining the 
relationship between director independence and earnings manipulation. 
Models 6-9 examine the univariate relation between other corporate governance 
characteristics and earnings management.  As models 6 and 7 show, the absolute value of 
discretionary accruals is positively related to whether the CEO is on the board’s 
nominating committee (p=.05) or on the board’s compensation committee (p=.01).  Thus, 
earnings manipulation appears to be positively correlated with the CEO’s power over 
board matters.  In model 8, earnings management is negatively related to whether a large 
blockholder sits on the board’s audit committee (p=.05).  This supports the relationship 
investing hypothesis.  Finally, in model 9, the coefficient on the percent of inside 
shareholdings is positive at the .10 level, suggesting a positive association between 
earnings management and inside directors’ shareholdings. 
 
6.4  Multivariate Models 
Table 5 presents multivariate models relating board characteristics to 
discretionary accruals.  For these models, I control for other factors that may be related to 
earnings management or board/audit committee independence.  As Bartov, Gul and Tsui 
(2000) show, failure to control for confounding factors may result in falsely rejecting the 
null hypothesis of no earnings management when in fact the null is true.  Explanatory 
variables capturing earnings management are extreme earnings performance (the absolute 
change in the previous year’s income before extraordinary items divided by total assets), 
financial leverage (total debt divided by total assets), and political costs (log of beginning 
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year’s assets).38  These variables were found to be significantly related to earnings 
management by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995), Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995), 
DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994), Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998), 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) and Bartov, Gul and Tsui (2000).  Explanatory 
variables capturing variations in audit committee composition are market-to-book ratios, 
past negative earnings (two or more previous consecutive years), and firm size (log of 
beginning year’s assets).  Klein (2000b) finds evidence that these variables are related to 
audit and board committee compositions. 
 As Table 5 shows, earnings manipulation is negatively related at the .05 level to 
whether the board’s audit committee has a majority of independent directors.  This 
supports the view that audit committee independence is related to earnings management.  
However, contrary to the intentions of the new guidelines promulgated by the exchanges, 
there appears to be no meaningful relation between earnings management and having an 
audit committee comprised solely of independent auditors. 
 As Table 5 also shows, for each of the five models, having the CEO on the 
board’s compensation committee yields a significantly (at the .05 level) positive 
coefficient.  In addition, the coefficient on having a 5% blockholder on the audit 
committee is significantly negative at the .05 level for each of the equations.  These 
results support the view that board characteristics geared towards producing a more 
independent and active corporate governance environment results in less earnings 
management. 
 
                                                                 
38 The correlation between the log of total assets and the signed discretionary accrual is -.01 (p=.80).  The 
correlation between the log of total assets and the unsigned (absolute value) discretionary accrual is -.22 
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6.5  Sensitivity Analyses 
 The multivariate models in Table 5 suggest that earning management is correlated 
with various board and audit committee characteristics.  In this section, I conduct several 
sensitivity analyses to determine the robustness of the results. 
 First, I use the modified cross-sectional Jones model presented in equation (3) of 
this paper.  The univariate and multivariate results with this specification are almost 
identical to those presented in Table 5.  For example, the reestimated coefficients and c2 
values for models 3 (Aud100%) and 4 (Aud51%) in Table 5 are 0.04 (c2 = 0.09) and  
 -0.39 (c2 = 5.58), respectively.  Qualitatively similar findings are found for the other 
variables in Tables 4 and 5. 
 Second, in Tables 4 and 5, I use inside director shareholdings as a board 
characteristic variable.  Table 4 reported a significantly positive coefficient (p=.06) in the 
univariate model but Table 5 reported insignificant coefficients (p>.10) in the 
multivariate analyses.  To examine the robustness of this variable, I re-estimate the 
models using CEO’s shareholdings or all-director shareholdings as substitute variables.  
For the univariate models, the coefficients and p-values are 5.89 (p=.001) for 
CEO shareholdings and 0.23 (p=.43) for all-director shareholdings.  Thus, the coefficient 
reported in Table 4 appears to be driven primarily by the CEO shareholdings. It also 
suggests that CEOs may use earnings management as a means to increase their share 
values, an interpretation consistent with Aboody and Kasznik (2000) and with Yermack 
(1997). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
(p=.01). 
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 In the multivariate models, using all-director shareholdings instead of inside 
director shareholdings has no marked effect.  The coefficients on all-director 
shareholdings, like inside director shareholdings, are insignificantly different from zero.  
Nor are the coefficients or significance levels for the other independent variables in the 
models affected.  Using CEO shareholdings, however, produces two results distinct from 
those presented in Table 5.  First, the coefficients for CEO shareholdings are significantly 
positive at the .01 or .02 levels for each of the five models.  Second, including CEO 
shareholdings increases the p-values of the (still positive) coefficient CEO on 
Compensation Committee to insignificant levels. Table 6 contains summary statistics for 
this set of models.  I interpret these findings as additional evidence that given the 
opportunity, CEOs will manipulate earnings to increase their total compensation. 
 Third, I broaden the relationship-investing variable by lowering the threshold for 
the percentage of shares that the non-management director sitting on the audit committee 
must hold.  In Tables 4 and 5, I require a 5% stake; 1.7% of firms in the sample had type 
of shareholder. The coefficients are around -0.95, with significance levels at .02 or .03. 
Reducing the stake sequentially from 4% to 3% to 2% increases the incidence of the 
relationship investor to 2.6%, 2.8%, and 3.6%, respectively.  As expected, the significance 
levels, in general, diminish alongside the stake.  For the 2% definition, the p-values hover 
around .30; for the 3% definition, the p-values are around .09; for the 4% definition, the p-
values come up to around .02.  The corresponding coefficients are approximately -0.30,   
-0.60, and -0.85, respectively.    
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VI.  Summary and Conclusions 
 This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are 
related to earnings management by the firm.  The motivation behind this study is the 
implicit assertion by the SEC, the NYSE and the NASDAQ that earnings management 
and poor corporate governance mechanisms are positively related. 
 A non-linear negative relation is found between audit committee independence 
and earnings manipulation.   Specifically, a significant relation is found only when the 
audit committee has less than a majority of independent directors.  Contravene to the new 
regulations, no significant association is found between earnings management and the 
more stringent requirement of 100% audit committee independence.   
Empirical evidence is provided that other corporate governance characteristics are 
related to earnings management.  Earnings management is positively related to whether 
the CEO sits on the board’s compensation committee.  It is negatively related to the 
CEO’s shareholdings and to whether a large outside shareholder sits on the board’s audit 
committee. These results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the 
CEO may be more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process. 
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Table 1 
 
Comparison of Time-Series vs. Cross-Sectional Expectation Models For Accruals 
 
Model:  ACCRj,t/TAj,t -1 = á [1/ TAj,t -1] + â [ÄREVj,t/ TAj,t -1] + ã [PPEj,t/ TAj,t -1] + åj,t 
 
Modela Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum %Positive T: 
Mean=0 
Estimate of á         
Jones – CS -0.01 0.42 0.00 -5.70 4.89   92%  -0.90 
Jones - TS 986.35 2,364.11 226.42 -3,367.22 18,965.42 89 10.90* 
        
Estimate of â        
Jones – CS 0.03 0.10 0.02 -1.07 0.53 75 7.83* 
Jones - TS 0.08 0.47 0.06 -3.32 3.04 64 4.63* 
        
Estimate of ã        
Jones – CS -0.08 0.06 -0.08 -0.25 0.36   7 -15.84* 
Jones - TS -0.24 0.40 -0.23 -3.57 3.39 11 -32.02* 
        
        
aJones – CS is the cross-sectional Jones model.  Jones – TS is the time-series Jones model. 
 
*significant at the .01 level. 
 
Notes - ACCR is total accruals; TA is total assets; REV is sales revenues; PPE is gross Property, Plant and 
Equipment.  The sample for the cross-sectional Jones model is from the Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
Industrial Annual and Industrial Research Annual files.  To be included, at least eight firms with the same 
two-digit SIC codes had to be available each year.  The sample for the time-series Jones model comes from 
the S&P 500 listings for March 1992 and 1993.  To be included, each firm had to have eight observations 
on the Standard and Poor’s Compustat Industrial Annual and Industrial Research Annual files from one-
year prior to the designated year through nine years prior. 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Sample of S&P 500 Firms 
 
Variable  Mean Std. Dev. Median Minimum Maximum %Positive 
Net Income .06 .08 .05 -.30 .48    84% 
Operating Cash Flows .12 .08 .11 -.13 .48 97 
Total Accruals -.06 .06 -.06 -.41 .14 10 
Abs(Total Accruals) .07 .05  .06  .00 .41 100 
Assets 8,960 21,352 3,145 179 174,429 100 
       
Discretionary Accruals       
   Jones – CS .003 .42 -.003 -4.76 5.63 48 
   Jones – TS -988 2365 -227 -18,965 3,367 12 
   Modified Jones – CS .003 .42 -.003 -4.75 6.63 48 
   Modified Jones – TS -988 2365 -226 -18,965 3,367 12 
       
Abs(Discretionary 
Accruals) 
      
   Jones – CS .11 .41 .04 .00003 5.63 100 
   Jones – TS 1,093 2318 274 .003 18,965 100 
   Modified Jones – CS .11 .41 .04 .00002 5.63 100 
   Modified Jones – TS 1,093 2319 275 .0127 18,965 100 
       
 
Notes – The sample consists of firms listed on the S&P 500 for 1992 and 1993.  Net Income is net income 
before extraordinary items (Compustat item # 18).  Operating cash flows is from the cash flows statement 
(Compustat item # 308).  Total accruals is the difference between net income and operating cash flows.  
Abs is the absolute value.  Assets is the total assets (Compustat item # 6).  Discretionary Accruals is the 
difference between total accruals and non-discretionary accruals calculated using the Jones cross-sectional 
model (Jones – CS) or the Jones times-series model (Jones – TS).  All variables are scaled by total assets. 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Corporate Governance Data 
 
 Whole Board  Audit Committee 
Percentage of Directors who are:   
      Insiders     22.5%      1.4% 
      Outsiders 58.4 79.6 
      Affiliates 19.1 19.0 
   
Percentage of Firms with:   
      100% Outside Directors 0%    43.4% 
      Majority of Outside Directors 73.8 86.7 
      CEO on Nominating Committee 52.1 NA 
      CEO on Compensation Committee 9.2  NA 
      5% Outside Director on Audit Committee NA 1.7 
 
 
Sample is for 687 U.S. firms with audit committees listed on the S&P 500 as of March 31, 1992 and 1993 
with annual shareholder meetings between July 1, 1991 and June 30, 1993.  Financial institutions and firms 
with missing Compustat data are excluded. 
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Table 4 
 
Univariate Models of Absolute Values of Discretionary Accruals on 
 Board and Audit Committee Composition  (parameter estimates and ÷2-Values) 
 
 Intercept Bd51% %OUT Aud100% Aud51% %AUDOUT CEO on  
Nom Comm. 
CEO on 
Comp Comm. 
5%Block. On 
Aud. Comm. 
%Inside 
Shares 
Model 1 -2.47 -0.30         
 (465.11)a ( 5.17)b         
           
Model 2 -2.56  -0.22        
 (155.52)a  ( 0.42)        
           
Model 3 -2.69   0.02       
 (1147.69)a   ( 0.02)       
           
Model 4 -2.44    -0.29      
 (233.66)a    ( 2.97)c      
           
Model 5 -2.62     -0.09     
 (151.65)a     (0.12)     
           
Model 6 -2.84      0.28    
 (1088.78)a      ( 6.06)b    
           
Model 7 -2.69       0.59   
 (1893.44)a       ( 8.95)a   
           
Model 8 -2.68        -0.94  
 (1875.49)a        ( 4.57)b  
           
Model 9 -2.75         2.08 
 (1641.29)a         ( 3.73)c 
 
(a), (b),  (c) = significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level respectively. 
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Notes – The dependent variable in all models is the absolute value of discretionary accruals as determined 
by the cross-sectional Jones model.  The dependent variable is modeled as a lognormal distribution.  The 
parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood using a Newton-Raphson algorithm. 
 
Bd51% takes on the value of one if the firm’s board has at least a majority of outside directors, and zero 
otherwise.  %OUT is the percentage of outsiders on the firm’s board.  Aud100% takes on the value of one 
if the firm’s audit committee has outside directors only, and zero otherwise.  Aud51% takes on the value of 
one if the firm’s audit committee has at least a majority of outside directors, and zero otherwise.  
%AUDOUT is the percentage of outsiders on the firm’s audit committee.  CEO on Nom. Comm. and CEO 
on Comp. Comm. are indicators if the CEO is a sitting member of either committee respectively or if no 
committee exists.  5%Block. on Aud. Comm. is an indicator if a non-inside 5% blockholder sits on the 
board’s audit committee. %Ins. Shrs. is the percentage of shares owned by inside directors.
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Table 5 
 
Multivariate Models of Absolute Values of Discretionary Accruals  
on Board and Audit Committee Composition 
(parameter estimates and ÷2-Values) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -1.77 -2.07 -1.93 -1.57 -1.84 
 ( 17.32)a ( 20.88)a ( 20.71)a ( 13.26)a (16.15)a 
      
Bd51% -0.15     
 ( 1.23)     
%OUT  0.34    
  ( 0.82)    
Aud100%   0.04   
   ( 0.10)   
Aud51%    -0.39  
    ( 5.60)b  
%AUDOUT     -0.06 
     ( 0.06) 
      
MV/BV  -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.0002 0.0003 
 ( 0.01) ( 0.01) ( 0.003) ( 0.0005) ( 0.001) 
      
Abs(ÄNI) 5.60 5.43 5.49 5.55 5.54 
 ( 12.09)a ( 11.41) a ( 11.67)a ( 12.23)a ( 11.92)a 
      
Neg. NI 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.32 0.29 
 ( 1.46) ( 1.54) ( 1.54) ( 1.77)  ( 1.45) 
      
Debt  0.12  0.04  0.09  0.13  0.09 
 ( 0.09) ( 0.01) ( 0.05) ( 0.11) ( 0.05) 
      
%Ins Shrs. 0.34 0.83 0.61 0.50 0.56 
 ( 0.09) ( 0.52) ( 0.30) ( 0.20) ( 0.25) 
      
CEO on Nom. 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.23 0.17 
Committee ( 1.76) ( 2.26) ( 1.98) ( 3.44)c ( 2.03) 
      
CEO on Comp.  0.38  0.45 0.44  0.42  0.42 
Committee ( 3.01)c ( 4.42)b ( 4.12)b ( 3.83)b ( 3.89)b 
      
5% Blockholder -0.91 -1.01 -0.96 -0.94 -0.96 
On Audit Comm. ( 4.43)b ( 5.37)b ( 4.99)b ( 4.89)b ( 4.91)b 
      
Log(Assets) -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 
 ( 9.46)a ( 9.81)a ( 9.19)a ( 10.05)a ( 9.51)a 
      
 
(a), (b),  (c) = significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level respectively. 
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Notes – The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals as measured by the cross-
sectional Jones model.  The dependent variable is modeled as a lognormal distribution.  The parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood using a Newton-Raphson algorithm. 
 
Bd51% takes on the value of one if the firm’s board has at least a majority of outside directors, and zero 
otherwise.  %OUT is the percentage of outsiders on the firm’s board.  Aud100% takes on the value of one 
if the firm’s audit committee has outside directors only, and zero otherwise.  Aud51% takes on the value of 
one if the firm’s audit committee has at least a majority of outside directors, and zero otherwise.  
%AUDOUT is the percentage of outsiders on the firm’s audit committee. 
 
MV/BV is the market value of the total firm over assets, measured at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Abs(ÄNI) is the absolute value of the change in net income between years t-1 and t.  Neg. NI. is an 
indicator if the firm had two or more consecutive years of negative income, ending on the fiscal year prior 
to the shareholders’ meeting.  Debt is long-term debt divided by last year’s assets. %Ins. Shrs. is the 
percentage of shares owned by inside directors. CEO on Nom. Committee and CEO on Comp. Committee 
are indicators if the CEO is a sitting member of either committee, respectively or if there is no committee. 
5% Blockholder on Audit Comm. is an indicator if a non-inside 5% blockholder sits on the board’s audit 
committee.  Log(Assets) is the natural log of the book value of assets.  
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Table 6 
 
Sensitivity Analyses Using %Shares Owned by CEO Instead of  
%Shares Owned by Inside Shareholders 
(parameter estimates and ÷2-Values) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Intercept -1.97 -2.28 -2.09 -1.72 -2.00 
 ( 21.76)a ( 26.23)a ( 24.83)a ( 16.28)a ( 19.37)a 
      
Bd51% -0.11     
 ( 0.67)     
%OUT  0.46    
  ( 1.62)    
Aud100%   0.05   
   ( 0.19)   
Aud51%    -0.40  
    ( 5.95)b  
%AUDOUT     -0.07 
     ( 0.07) 
      
MV/BV   0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 ( 0.004) ( 0.06) ( 0.03) ( 0.01) ( 0.02) 
      
Abs(ÄNI) 5.74 5.54 5.64 5.75 5.71 
 ( 12.97)a ( 12.08) a ( 12.50)a ( 13.36)a ( 12.86)a 
      
Neg. NI 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.31 
 ( 1.71) ( 1.80) ( 1.81) ( 2.04)  ( 1.69) 
      
Debt  0.04  -0.05  0.02  0.06  0.02 
 ( 0.01) ( 0.02) ( 0.003) ( 0.03) ( 0.002) 
      
%CEO shares 4.22 4.78 4.45 4.49 4.41 
 ( 6.04)a ( 7.62)a ( 6.81)a ( 6.97)a ( 6.69)a 
      
CEO on Nom. 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.14 
Committee ( 1.11) ( 1.60) ( 1.25) ( 2.44) ( 1.29) 
      
CEO on Comp.  0.20  0.28 0.25  0.21  0.23 
Committee ( 0.87) ( 1.60) ( 1.35) ( 0.99) ( 1.14) 
      
5% Blockholder -0.99 -1.09 -1.03 -1.01 -1.02 
On Audit Comm. ( 5.24)b ( 6.34)b ( 5.73)b ( 5.64)b ( 5.64)b 
      
Log(Assets) -0.12 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 
 ( 7.40)a ( 8.07)a ( 7.14)a ( 7.89)a ( 7.46)a 
      
 
(a), (b),  (c) = significant at the .01, .05, and .10 level respectively. 
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Notes – The dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals as determined by the cross-
sectional Jones model.  The dependent variable is modeled as a lognormal distribution.  The parameters are 
estimated by maximum likelihood using a Newton-Raphson algorithm. 
 
Bd51% takes on the value of one if the firm’s board has at least a majority of outside directors, and zero 
otherwise.  %OUT is the percentage of outsiders on the firm’s board.  Aud100% takes on the value of one 
if the firm’s audit committee has outside directors only, and zero otherwise.  Aud51% takes on the value of 
one if the firm’s audit committee has at least a majority of outside directors, and zero otherwise.  
%AUDOUT is the percentage of outsiders on the firm’s audit committee. 
 
MV/BV is the market value of the total firm over assets, measured at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
Abs(ÄNI) is the absolute value of the change in net income between years t-1 and t.  Neg. NI is an indicator 
if the firm had two or more consecutive years of negative income, ending on the fiscal year prior to the 
shareholders’ meeting.  Debt is long-term debt divided by last year’s assets. %Ins. Shrs. is the percentage of 
shares owned by inside directors. CEO on Nom. Committee and CEO on Comp.  Committee are indicators 
if the CEO is a sitting member of either committee, respectively. 5% Blockholder on Audit Comm. is an 
indicator if a non-inside 5% blockholder sits on the board’s audit committee.  Log(Assets) is the natural log 
of the book value of assets.  
 
 
